Mayflies and long-distance runners: The effects of new business formation on industry growth by Falck, Oliver
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Falck, Oliver
Working Paper
Mayflies and long-distance runners: The effects of
new business formation on industry growth
Passauer Diskussionspapiere: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe, No. V-39-05
Provided in cooperation with:
Universität Passau
Suggested citation: Falck, Oliver (2005) : Mayflies and long-distance runners: The effects of
new business formation on industry growth, Passauer Diskussionspapiere: Volkswirtschaftliche






Mayflies and Long-Distance Runners: 








Diskussionsbeitrag Nr. V-39-05 
 









   DISKUSSIONSPAPIERE  
Herausgeber: 
Die Gruppe der volkswirtschaftlichen Professoren 
Der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät 






































Für den Inhalt der Passauer Diskussionspapiere sind die jeweiligen Autoren 
verantwortlich. Es wird gebeten, sich mit Anregungen und Kritik direkt an die 
Autoren zu wenden. 
 
Mayflies and Long-Distance Runners: 









This paper analyzes the effects of new business formation on industry growth. 
Dynamic panel techniques are used to test two hypotheses. First, does hit-and-
run competition secure efficiency in an industry? Second, do innovative start-
ups lead to amplified innovations by diminishing the knowledge filter? The 
results illustrate how new businesses can be viewed as either mayflies or long-
distance runners.  
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Mayflies and Long-Distance Runners: 
The Effects of New Business Formation on Indus-
try Growth 
 
Introduction: New Business Formation and Growth 
Does new business formation cause economic growth? Much recent re-
search has been devoted to this question. Parker (2005, 36–37) surveys the re-
cent empirical literature and finds evidence that new business formation is 
positively linked to growth at three different levels. 
•  At the level of the individual business—smaller and newer businesses 
tend to have higher growth rates than average. 
•  At the industry level—industries with higher entry rates of small busi-
nesses have above-average rates of productivity growth and innova-
tion. 
•  And finally, there is evidence that new business formation drives re-
gional economic growth. 
There are two prominent explanations for the positive correlation between new 
business formation and growth.
1 
One explanation concerns securing efficiency by contesting established 
market positions. In the contestable markets approach, the threat posed by the 
possibility of new businesses entering the market is taken to be a key determi-
nant of the behavior of existing firms (see Baumol/Panzar/Willig, 1982). Ac-
cordingly, barriers to entry and exit play a crucial role. Contestability is a 
measure of the extent to which a market is open to new entry. At the extreme, a 
market with no entry or exit barriers is perfectly contestable. The existence of 
abnormal profit, no matter how small, would trigger new entry in such a mar-
ket. Assuming that existing businesses wish to deter new entry, the logical con-  3
clusion is that they will set prices at such a level that only normal profits are 
made. They will also produce at lowest possible average cost. In a perfectly 
contestable market, therefore, we expect firms to be productively efficient. 
Markets that are highly contestable are likely to be vulnerable to hit-and-run 
competition. Consider a situation where incumbent businesses are pricing at 
above the entry-limit level. New entry will be profitable as long as there is a 
time lag between entry and the reaction of the incumbent firms. Having made a 
profit in the intervening period, the new entrant can then costlessly leave the 
market as there are no exit barriers. A major exit barrier is sunk costs. Sunk 
costs will not occur where the firm can sell or in other ways dispose of its capi-
tal equipment without cost to itself. 
The other explanation for the correlation between new business forma-
tion and growth is amplified innovation. Theories of endogenous growth in the 
tradition of Romer (1986) emphasize the influence of research and develop-
ment on economic growth. Among other activities, private businesses generate 
new knowledge through research and development. The created knowledge 
may be exploited by them or by other businesses that compete in the same in-
dustry (see Mueller, 2005, 2). One reason for the producer of such knowledge 
not exploiting it could be that it, as an incumbent firm, does not want to take 
the risks associated with new products or processes. It might instead focus on 
exploiting the profit possibilities of its already existing product program (see 
Geroski, 1995, 431; Audretsch, 1995). Another explanation for the lack of new 
knowledge exploitation by its producer might be because the necessary reor-
ganization measures can be implemented only with difficulty in established 
(large) businesses (see Jovanovic, 2001). Entrepreneurial activity, setting up a 
business, and commercializing unexploited knowledge can be assumed as a 
mechanism by which knowledge spillovers occur (see Mueller, 2005, 4). 
Founders of new firms might have worked for incumbent firms or the new ven-
ture might be a new branch of a existing firm. Audretsch (1995) points out that 
many radical innovations have been introduced by new businesses rather than 
by incumbents. A key assumption (see Acs/Audretsch/Braunerhjelm/Carlsson, 
                                                                                                                                 
1 Fritsch/Mueller (2004, 962–963) actually enumerate four reasons: securing efficiency, accel-
eration of structural change, amplified innovation, and greater variety of products.   4
2003) is that new business formation diminishes the knowledge filter between 
the creation and exploitation of knowledge. 
The goal of this paper is not to introduce further potential links between 
new business formation and growth but, instead, to use dynamic panel tech-
niques to test the two hypotheses of secured efficiency by hit-and-run competi-
tion and amplified innovation as new business formation diminishes the 
knowledge filter. Dynamic panel techniques have been used fruitfully in em-
pirical research on the determinants of economic growth (for an overview, see 
Kappler, 2004). These techniques take the time-series properties of the follow-
ing data into account.  
Data 
The analysis is carried out at the industry level. The information on the 
number of establishments and startups in an industry is generated from the 
German Social Insurance Statistics.
2 The data are comprised of the yearly 
number of existing and new establishments in West Germany for 44 private 
industries (manufacturing, construction, and services) from 1984 to 2001. The 
data cover only establishments with at least one employee other than the foun-
der; startups of establishments that remained very small (i.e., without any em-
ployees) are not included. For each cohort it is possible to track the new estab-
lishments over time. To test the two hypotheses of secured efficiency by hit-
and-run competition and amplified innovation as new business formation di-
minishes the knowledge filter, a short-run start-up rate and a long-run start-up 
rate are defined as follows. The short-run start-up rate is the number of new 
establishments surviving for only one year per 1,000 establishments, which is 
used as a proxy for hit-and-run competition. The long-run start-up rate is the 
number of new establishments surviving for at least five years per 1,000 estab-
lishments. Assuming that long-lived startups are innovative or at least high-
quality, the long-run start-up rate can be used as a proxy for the diminished 
knowledge filter by new firm formation. The industry gross domestic product, 
in prices of 1991, is from the Federal Statistical Office. 
                                                 
2 See Fritsch/Brixy (2004) for a description of this data source.   5
As new establishments must be tracked for at least five years to calcu-
late the long-run start-up rate, the final panel data set covers 44 private indus-
tries over the time period 1984–1996. Descriptive statistics for the variables in 
use are set out in the Appendix. 
The time series data is partially nonstationary, which must be taken into 
account in econometric estimation. To test the nonstationarity of the variables, 
panel unit root tests are carried out by the method proposed by Im/Pesaran/Shin 
(2002). Table 1 shows the results of the tests. 
Table 1: Panel unit root test 
variable  test statistic  p value 
gross domestic product (log)  2.04  0.98 
Δ gross domestic product (log)  –8.07  0.00 
number of establishments (log)  5.10  1.00 
Δ number of establishments (log)  –7.81 0.00 
long-run start-up rate  –4.10  0.00 
short-run start-up rate  –8.15  0.00 
Number of cross-sections = 44. Number of time periods = 13. Individual effects (all variables) 
and time trends (gross domestic product (log) and number of establishments (log)). Null hy-
pothesis: unit root (individual unit root process). Lagged differences are included according to 
the modified Schwarz-criterion. 
The results are clear cut: the gross domestic product (log) and number 
of establishments (log) variables are integrated of order one, whereas the short-
run start-up rate and long-run start-up rate variables are stationary. 
 
Estimation Method 
Determining the order of integration for the variables is important for 
setting up the cointegration analysis. If there is a linear combination of two or 
more nonstationary series that is stationary, the nonstationary time series are 
said to be cointegrated. This stationary combination can be interpreted as a 
long-run equilibrium. Only the nonstationary series enter the cointegration rela-
tionship. All stationary series enter as exogenous variables in the estimation of 
the corresponding (short-run) error correction model. 
The results of the unit root tests support a long-run relation between the 
industry gross domestic product (log) and the number of establishments in the 
industry (log). The long-run relationship represents the underlying production   6
condition in the industry: 
(log) (log) it i it it grossdomestic product numberof etablishments α βε = +⋅ +. (1) 
In Equation (1), the industry-specific intercept  i α  stands for the gross domestic 
product (log) of a representative firm in the industry under inspection. The 
slope coefficient β  is assumed to be 1 for all industries. It can be interpreted as 
an elasticity: if the number of representative establishments in the industry 
grows by 1%, the industry gross domestic product also increases by 1%.  it ε  
represents an error term. 
The existence of a long-run relation between the industry gross domes-
tic product (log) and the number of establishments in the industry (log) is con-
sistent with the findings of Agarwal (1998), who presents strong empirical evi-
dence on the product lifecycle of an industry. Agarwal (1998) shows the evolu-
tion of industries through regularities in the time paths of key industry vari-
ables, in particular the number of firms and the price and quantity of a product. 
Her study summarizes the time trends of the industry variables by regressing 
the key industry variables on product market age. The number of firms and the 
sum of the logarithms of product price and quantity follow very similar time 
patterns so that a long-run relation between these variables can be assumed. 
Consequently, the presented long-run relation between the industry gross do-
mestic product (log) and the number of establishments in the industry (log) can 
be interpreted from an evolutionary point of view as the product lifecycle of 
the respective industry. 






it it it it
grossdomestic product numberof establishments
short runstart uprate innovativestart uprate errorcorrectionterm
β
β ββ υ
Δ= + ⋅ Δ
+⋅ +⋅ +⋅ +
. (2) 
According to the hypotheses of secured efficiency by hit-and-run competition 
and amplified innovation as new business formation diminishes the knowledge 
filter, on average, positive slope coefficients  2 β  and  3 β  are expected. As the 
influence of the short-run start-up rate and the long-run start-up rate may vary 
at different stages of the industry lifecycle, the slope coefficients are allowed to 
be different depending on the stage of the industry lifecycle. Following 
Gort/Klepper (1982), the 44 industries studied in this paper are classified into   7
five lifecycle stages during the observation period 1984–1996. Stage I begins 
with the commercial introduction of new products and ends with a sharp in-
crease in the rate of entry of new competitors. Stage II is the period of sharp 
increase in the number of producers. Stage III is the period in which the num-
ber of entrants is roughly balanced by the number of exiting firms. Stage IV is 
the period of negative net entry. Stage V is a second period of approximately 
zero net entry. Industries were classified by visual inspection of the plotted 
series: there were 0 in Stage I, 23 in Stage II, 8 in Stage III, 11 in Stage IV, and 
2 in Stage V. In Equation (2),  4 β  has to be negative and represents the average 
of the industry-specific speed of adjustment to equilibrium.  it υ  represents an 
error term. 
 
Results and Policy Conclusions 
Table 2 shows the results of the long-run and short-run error correction 
models. Because there might be a certain degree of multicollinearity between 
the short-run start-up rate and long-run start-up rate variables, the error correc-
tion model was carried out in different specifications, including both variables 
or including only one of the two variables. 
Before interpreting the results, the estimated long-run relationship 
needs to be tested for cointegration. Cointegration analysis is carried out using 
tests proposed by Pedroni (1995, 1997, 1999). Pedroni (1995, 1997) first pro-
posed tests for the null hypothesis of no cointegration in heterogeneous panels 
for bivariate equations and then extended them for multiple regressors (see 
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Table 2: Results  
variable coefficient  t statistic 
long-run model (dependent variable: gross domestic product (log)) 
with industry-specific intercepts 
number of establishments (log)  0.9291  6.13 
short-run Model I (dependent variable: Δ gross domestic product (log)) 
Δ number of establishments (log)  0.6285*** 4.73 
long-run start-up rate  0.0002***  2.79 
long -run start-up rate * Stage III  –0.0002**  –2.10 
long -run start-up rate * Stage IV  –0.00003  –0.14 
long -run start-up rate * Stage V  0.0001  0.39 
error correction term  –0.2181***  –8.05 
short-run Model II (dependent variable: Δ gross domestic product (log)) 
Δ number of establishments (log)  0.7526*** 5.79 
short-run start-up rate   0.0002  1.30 
short-run start-up rate * Stage III  –0.0009*  1.88 
short-run start-up rate * Stage IV  0.0002  0.41 
long -run start-up rate * Stage V  0.0013  1.27 
error correction term  –0.2204***  –8.11 
short-run Model III (dependent variable: Δ gross domestic product (log)) 
Δ number of establishments (log)  0.6064*** 4.49 
long-run start-up rate  0.0006***  3.36 
long -run start-up rate * Stage III  –0.0003  –0.87 
long -run start-up rate * Stage IV  0.0001  0.29 
long -run start-up rate * Stage V  –0.0007  –1.17 
short-run start-up rate   –0.0007**  –2.15 
short-run start-up rate * Stage III  –0.0004  –0.41 
short-run start-up rate * Stage IV  –0.0005  –0.39 
long -run start-up rate * Stage V  0.0028  1.52 
error correction term  –0.2177***  –8.06 
Stage III, Stage IV, and Stage V are dummies with value of 1 if the industry is classified in the 
respective stage of the lifecycle. 
***: statistically significant at the 1 percent level. **: statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level. *: statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Table 3: Cointegration test for the long-run model 
statistic  test statistic  p value 
panel ν -stat  2.89  0.99 
panel ρ -stat  –0.60  0.27 
panel PP-stat  –1.81  0.04 
panel ADF-stat  –3.32  0.00 
group ρ -stat  2.53  0.99 
group PP-stat  –0.11  0.45 
group ADF-stat  –2.29  0.01 
Number of cross-sections = 44. Number of time periods = 13. 
All reported values are distributed N(0,1) under null of unit root or no cointegration. 
The cointegration tests result in a somewhat conflicting pattern. For 
panels with a limited number of observations, the ADF-based statistics are 
most suitable and indicate the existence of cointegration. 
The slope coefficient in the long-run equation is, as expected, signifi-
cantly positive and close to 1. The coefficient of the error correction term is   9
significantly negative in all short-run models, which signals a stable long-run 
equilibrium. 
The results confirm the hypothesis of a diminished knowledge filter by 
long-run start-ups. The slope coefficient for the long-run start-up rate is signifi-
cantly positive. However, no differences for the different stages of the industry 
lifecycle can be found except in short-run Model I. The slope coefficients for 
the different stages of the industry lifecycle are calculated as the sum of the 
overall slope coefficient for the start-up rate and the stage-specific slope coef-
ficient. Only coefficients significantly different from zero are taken into ac-
count. Following this procedure, the influence of the long-run start-up rate for 
Stage III in short-run Model I is close to zero. According to Gort/Klepper 
(1982), during Stage III, technology matures and the most dramatic product 
improvements are realized, after which the rate of important innovations de-
clines. Consequently, innovative entries play a subordinated role during Stage 
III.  
On the other hand, the hypothesis of hit-and-run competition has not 
been confirmed by empirical evidence. The slope coefficient for the short-run 
start-up rate is either not significantly different from zero or significantly nega-
tive. Potential competition already disciplines incumbent firms. Incumbents 
cannot exploit consumers by reducing output, raising prices, and earning su-
pernormal profits in a market without barriers to entry and exit. Consequently, 
short-run startups, having misinterpreted their market opportunities, are noth-
ing but mayflies. 
However, as long-run start-ups have a significantly positive impact on 
industry growth, growth policy should be concerned with the number of these 
high-quality firms, which could be called long-distance runners. Storey (2003) 
identifies examples of such a growth policy, including actions as diverse as 
facilitating access to loan finance and equity capital for high-quality startups, 
reducing administrative burdens for startups, building up science parks, and 
entrepreneurial education.    10
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rate (per 1,000 estab-
lishments) 
short-run start-up 
rate (per 1,000 estab-
lishments)  industry 
mean  std. dev.  mean  std. dev.  mean  std. dev.  mean  std. dev. 
Chemicals 68.34  5.65  2.65  0.04 32.24 4.39 10.94 2.40 
Mineral oil processing 39.52  7.04  0.12  0.00 26.03  15.23 7.92  7.35 
Plastics 22.23  3.29  5.49  0.26 40.54 5.89 14.25 2.70 
Rubber 8.20  0.41  0.82  0.01 30.25 6.47  8.72  3.13 
Stone and clay  19.49  1.51  9.58 0.36  24.00  1.76  7.19  0.92 
Ceramics 2.74  0.35  0.94  0.02 40.80 9.34 16.60 5.36 
Glass 6.01  0.62  0.88  0.04 30.00 6.51 13.14 4.28 
Iron and steel  14.97  0.89  0.18 0.01  34.05 15.96  9.19  8.30 
Nonferrous metals  6.52  1.25 0.26 0.02 48.51 12.90 16.90  7.46 
Foundries 7.59  0.85  0.91  0.02 26.61 7.36  8.83  2.32 
Steel processing  20.87  2.38  20.08  0.36 34.38 2.63 11.32 1.11 
Steel and light metal con-
struction  14.17 1.63 5.84 0.78  51.92 5.21 25.00 2.18 
Machinery, gears, drive 
units other machine parts  85.92 7.03 12.26 0.78  42.09 4.73 11.42 1.13 
Office machinery and com-
puters  10.93 2.86 1.16 0.12  59.67 11.22 21.58  3.57 
Motor vehicles  85.15  8.41  31.04  0.78 36.02 4.29 10.25 0.94 
Shipbuilding 2.37  0.25  0.41 0.02  38.52 13.63 16.54  6.69 
Aerospace 6.23  1.24  0.16  0.03 59.40  17.71  19.92  11.53 
Electronics 88.81  9.61  14.14  1.16 47.66 5.42 14.60 1.29 
Fine mechanics, watches, 
and gauges  14.70 1.25 10.74 0.99  49.27 4.99  7.89  1.35 
Iron and metal goods  26.96  2.74  7.44  0.24 36.33 2.81 12.01 1.39 
Jewelry, musical instru-
ments, and toys  4.90 0.33 3.50 0.12 36.20 7.30 14.21 3.21 
Wood (excluding furniture)  3.63  0.54 3.24 0.20 17.21  2.89  7.18  1.92 
Furniture 20.13  1.08  33.62  0.29 32.15 2.32 11.21 1.38 
Paper making  6.43  0.47  0.17 0.01  31.61 11.21 14.08 12.97 
Paper processing and board  9.11  1.15  1.98  0.02 30.05 5.02 10.59 2.82 
Printing 17.61  1.15  11.48  0.55 38.41 4.42 12.61 1.68 
Textiles 13.04  1.93  3.47  0.31 24.79 4.49 12.56 1.68 
Leather 3.32  0.52  4.24  0.27 28.67 3.20 14.64 2.55 
Apparel 9.44  1.05  7.11  1.16 27.45 3.24 23.34 2.29 
Food 44.95  1.67  44.00  4.97 19.53 1.18  6.16  0.58 
Beverages 14.12  0.79  2.36  0.18 13.75 2.79  5.73  1.85 
Construction 77.88  3.03  63.27  5.19 40.08 3.50 29.11 5.66 
Installation 53.38  3.65  81.98  2.43 34.23 2.90 10.31 1.19 
Wholesale trade  112.81  12.33  109.91  4.68 44.38 2.98 22.50 1.50 
Resale trade  101.56  14.63  218.46  8.59 44.44 2.80 22.65 2.12 
Traffic and freight  6.05  0.59  2.65  0.22 42.92 7.45 16.25 3.20 
Postal services  59.37  11.11  59.03  5.13 50.06 2.69 28.69 2.09 
Banking and credit  95.63  13.05  17.05  0.42 23.48 2.76 11.15 1.71 
Insurance 29.98  5.90  17.68  2.47 57.50  10.95  31.23 7.38 
Real estate and housing 180.14  20.55  33.74  5.37 56.61 3.18 36.47 4.52 
Hotels, restaurants, etc.  30.97  2.12  110.49  7.25 52.64 3.15 49.43 3.95 
Science, publishing, etc.  43.34  4.47  29.24  3.68 61.06 4.82 39.26 6.60 
Healthcare 59.72  11.91  107.50  11.23 53.30  4.78  7.12  0.79 
Other private services  307.33  81.89  197.48  22.62  52.15 2.48 20.84 1.20 
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